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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, the role of the financial position of private agents in the 
transmission of monetary pollcy (the balance-sheet channel) is explored .  
To the extent that official interest rates are able to affect the market 
value and the income flows of certain categories of financial instruments 
and that these changes in financial wealth and interest income have an 
effect on aggregate expenditure , output and prices, supplementary 
transmission mechanisms arise in addition to those related to the 
substitution between current and future (or between domestic and 
foreign) demand . However, the pass-through from official interest rates 
to market rates and asset prices and the sensitivity of demand to wealth 
and interest income are not dealt with in the current exercise. By 
focusing mainly on analysing the financial position of private agents in 
two countries (Germany and Spain) ,  the scope is substantially more 
limited . Evidence provided points towards relatively small differences in 
the potential extent of the balance-sheet channel in both countries , 
although its potency seems to be larger in the case of Germany, 
particularly as far as non-financial enterprises are concerned. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 
Monetary policy is able to modify the financial conditions of an economy 
in a way that affects the rate of price increases and, in the short run, 
possibly also the rate at which real activity expands. In recent decades, 
the consensus on the role that monetary policy should play has 
strengthened: any temptation to use monetary policy in the short-run in 
a countercyclical fashion in order to stabilize activity at the expense of 
rising inflation should be avoided. Rather, central banks should direct 
their policy actions towards the achievement of price stability over the 
long-run as a pre-requisite for sustainable economic growth. 
However, while there is no dispute about the role monetary policy 
should play, knowledge about the precise mechanisms through which 
monetary impulses are transmitted to the economy is still limited. Until 
recently J this incomplete knowledge about the timing and extent of 
monetary policy effects on the final variables could be substituted to a 
satisfactory extent by concentrating on guiding the growth rate of 
monetary aggregates towards a previously decided path deemed consistent 
with the ultimate target of price stability. Nonetheless, in a number of 
countries, a progressive deterioration of the formerly stable relationships 
linking the policy instruments available to the central bank to the growth 
of money and the latter to the final targeted variables might have 
increased the need to improve central bankers' knowledge of the contents 
of the monetary policy black box. 
Relevant as they currently are for individual European countries, 
these difficulties in assessing the relative importance of the various 
channels through which monetary stimuli operate and the size and precise 
timing of their final effects are most likely to play an enhanced role after 
the start of the third stage of European monetary union. Should 
significant differences exist in the monetary policy transmission processes 
of the countries joining the single currency from its inception, the 
conduct of the single monetary policy may be complicated through the 
divergent impact of any decision on official interest rates on output and 
price developments across the single currency area, even assuming that 
policy priorities and cyclical positions do not diverge across countries. 
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The implications of this uneven transmission of monetary impulses are 
amplified by the reduced room for manoeuvre for fiscal policies, given the 
disequilibria accumulated in the past and the adoption of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
Divergent preferences and financial and labour market structures and 
institutions underlie these differences in transmission mechanisms. They 
are partly the heritage of historical developments, possibly related to the 
monetary policy track record of each country. However, in that a 
significant nominal convergence has been attained by a number of 
�uropean countries and that a growing degree of financial globalisation 
has emerged in recent decades, a certain development towards an 
autonomous harmonisation of financial structures and hence, transmission 
mechanisms, should have been expected in recent years. 
This note firstly reviews in section 2 the main channels through which 
monetary policy operates, without attempting to make any judgment on 
their relative significance. Next, it concentrates on one of those 
channels, namely, that operating through the structure of the balance 
sheets of the private non-financial agents of the economy. In section 4 ,  
an attempt Is made to assess the likely differences in the workings of this 
channel in two European countries (Germany and Spain). The note 
concludes with some final remarks, summarising the main similarities and 
divergences and highlighting the limitations of the current exercise. 
2. THE TRANSMISSION CHANNELS OF MONETARY POLICY('). 
Traditionally, the transmission of monetary impulses to the final 
variables had been regarded in a context which implicitly assumed a 
smooth functioning of financial markets. In such a framework, monetary 
policy works by inducing changes in the prices of alternative financial 
assets which, in turn, give rise to shifts in expenditure among different 
(') This section draws heavily on Bernanke and Gertler ( 1995) , 
Gertler (1988) and Mishkin ( 1 996) . 
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periods or countries. In the first place, to the extent that monetary policy 
can affect the interest rates associated with the relevant assets and 
liabilities , an intertemporal substitution of expenditure will take place. 
Secondly, interest rate movements will be reflected in changes of the 
value of the national currency and, consequently, in the relative price of 
foreign versus domestic goods, thus causing an interspatial substitution 
of expenditure. 
Considerations related to financial structures and institutions give rise 
to a number of mechanisms through which monetary impulses are deemed 
to be transmitted. These mechanisms should not be viewed as an 
alternative to the traditional channels. Rather, they should be understood 
as elements that tend to amplify the conventional effects . Attention to 
these issues , which dates back several decades (see, for instance, 
Brainard and Tobin ( 1963», has revived more recently . Two of these 
linkages amo�g actions taken by the monetary authorities and their 
effects on the final variables are described here . The first is the balance­
sheet channel , which involves the impact of monetary impulses on the final 
variables through variations in the net financial income perceived by 
agents (income effect) and on their net wealth (wealth effect) . These 
changes in agents' wealth and income will affect the willingness of 
households and firms to spend and, through imperfections in financial 
markets, the willingness of financial institutions to lend. The second 
channel (the bank lending channel) considers the possibility that banks 
may alter their offer of loanable funds in the wake of monetary policy 
impulses because of a reduction in the availability of bank reserves. 
2.1. Traditional transmission channels 
The most conventional view about how monetary policy works involves 
the direct impact of monetary impulses on intertemporal spend,ing 
d�cisions in the standard closed-economy IS-LM framework . Whenever a 
move -say J an increase- in official interest rates is able to affect short­
term real interest rates (through short-term price rigidities) and, in 
turn , these are able to affect long-term real interest rates (provided that 
the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of the yield curve 
holds) ,  current expenditure on investment, housing and consumer 
- 9 -
durable goods -which is assumed to depend on long-term interest rates­
will reduce and, thus, also aggregate demand and output. More 
generally, if the rise in official interest rates comes along with a general 
increase in real interest rates in the different markets and maturities, the 
incentives to postpone expenditure will increase, because borrowing to 
increase current expenditure becomes more expensive and saving in order 
to increase future expenditure becomes more attractive. 
The foregoing mechanism focuses on a closed economy in which just 
money and interest-yielding assets exist. When foreign exchange is 
introduced as an additional asset, a new channel of transmission arises. 
A restrictive monetary impulse, by increasing interest rates on financial 
instruments denominated in the domestic currency in relation to those 
denominated in foreign currency, gives rise to a relative increase in the 
demand for the former, which puts upward pressure on the national 
currency exchange rate. As a consequence, demend for domestic goods 
decreases, since they become relatively more expensive. 
Since this channel, as well as the one involving changes in the yields 
on interest-bearing assets denominated in the national currency, entails 
a substitution of aggregate demand (intertemporal, in the first case, and 
between domestic and foreign-produced goods, in the second one), we 
name both substitution effects of a monetary impulse. 
2.2. Transmission channels related to financial structures and 
institutions 
Considerations about the interrelatedness among the financial position 
of agents or the structure of the financial system and real variables have 
been absent from standard economic thinking over a long period of time. 
According to the traditional channels, the transmission of monetary 
impulses can be explained solely by the effects on spending and saving 
decisions of changes in the relative prices of financial assets induced by 
interest rate movements. In this way, any issues conc�rning financial 
structures are ignored, which implicitly is equivalent to assuming that 
financial markets are fully efficient, in the vein of the proposition from 
ModigJiani and Miller (1958), which stated that, in a context of perfect 
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markets, real economic decisions will be independent of considerations 
relating to the financial structure. However, allowing imperfections in 
financial markets to exist, new channels for monetary policy transmission 
arise (such as the balance-sheet channel and the bank lending channel) , 
which help to explain the power of this policy instrument. 
As far as the first of these mechanisms is concerned , in that monetary 
policy is able to affect the market value and the returns (costs) on the 
private non-financial sector·s assets (liabilities ) ,  the net wealth and 
current income of those agents will move accordingly . We name, 
respectively, as income and wealth effects , the impact on the final 
variables of changes in net financial income and net wealth associated with 
a monetary policy impUlse. 
The ways in which this balance-sheet channel operates are twofold. On 
the one hand , if monetary policy can alter the agents· current income and 
net wealth -in a way which will be dependent on the size and composition 
of households and firms' assets and liabilities-, their willingness to spend 
will be affected. Accordingly, an increase in official interest rates may 
either weaken or strengthen the private agents' financial position and 
thus will be reflected in aggregate demand and, ultimately, in output and 
prices . 
On the other hand , monetary policy effects on the soundness and 
composition of the private non-financial sector balance-sheet and on its 
cash-flow can affect the willingness of credit institutions to lend to those 
agents , as well as -for reasons unrelated to the substitution effects 
earlier described- the conditions under which credit is provided . This 
mechanism emphasises the role of asymmetric information in financial 
markets , since borrowers have an informational advantage over lenders 
concerning their quality as agents demanding loanable funds.  If we 
assume that a monetary contraction results in a reduction in net wealth 
and current income of would-be borrowers , lending would become more 
risky and, as a result, the global amount of loans might be reduced . The 
increased riskiness of borrowing would take place on two accounts . 
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Firstly, because of a rise in adverse selection problems12l• If the 
lenders use their perception about the average financial position of the 
borrowers (in terms of their balance-sheet and their income) as an 
indicator of the quality of the average borrower, and they find out that 
this indicator tends to deteriorate, the global amount of loanable funds 
will diminish. The reason is that a worse financial position will mean that 
the average borrower will find herself in a worse position to honour her 
debt -for instance, because her collateral will be less valuable or because 
the costs of servicing the debt in relation to disposable income will have 
risen-. Secondly, because of an increase in moral hazard problems: since, 
for instance, lower collateral will be available to the borrowers as a result 
of the worsening of their financial position, they may, before loan 
contracts are signed, undertake riskier expenditure projects and, after 
loan contracts have been signed, be more likely to default, since the cost 
of doing so is small. 
In any event, if either of the two elements are at play, a weaker 
balance-sheet and/or reduced cash-flow means that a debtor has fewer 
resources available to either self-finance projects or to offer them as 
collateral. This will be reflected in a larger cost and a reduced availability 
of external financing, since the informational risk faced by lenders is 
greater. Less credit will result in a reduction of expenditure and output, 
'2l These problems are analogous to those described by Akerlof 
( 1970) for the used-car market. Since the sellers of second-hand cars 
know better about their quality than the buyers, the single market price 
will not be able to distinguish among the different qualities of the cars 
being sold, but rather will reflect their average quality. The seller of a 
good car will be incurring in a negative premium to the benefit of the 
seller of a bad one (8 "lemon"). As a result, the overall size of the market 
may drop both because the owners of good cars may decide to leave the 
market and because of the reluctance of purchasers to buy the remaining 
cars. In the same fashion, interest rates in the credit market will tend to 
reflect the weighted probabilities of the borrower being either a "lemon" 
or a good-quality one. The global amount of loanable funds will be lower 
than in the absence of the informational problem, both because higher 
interest rates compared to a perfect information scenario will drive the 
good-quality borrowers out of the market and -perhaps, more 
importantly- because the fact that just the worst of them remain in the 
market will make the lenders reluctant to lend. 
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at least to the extent that the problem shows up uniformly in any 
financing source. (3) 
The bank lending channel also stresses frictions in the credit markets. 
It relies more heavily on the special role that financial intermediaries play 
when they solve (at least partially) through risk diversification the 
aforementioned problems of asymmetric information. When monetary 
authorities impart a contractive impulse, which reduces bank reserves, 
bank deposits also contract, and thus so does the amount of loanable 
funds available. For the lending channel to operate, two more conditions 
are required: there must be no perfect sustitutability of bank deposits 
with other bank liabilities, so that the supply of bank loanable funds is 
affected and, additionally, there must be no perfect sustitutability among 
bank credit and other sources of finance. The bank lending channel is 
unlikely to apply to large firms, whose access to the capital markets will 
be relatively easier. In the absence of information asymmetries, all 
borrowers with the same creditworthiness would be able to obtain funds 
under the same conditions. Nevertheless, the access to other sources of 
funds might be difficult not only for households, who do not have any 
direct access to financial markets, but also for small and young firms, due 
to the fact that lenders have better knowledge about the characteristics 
of mature and large firms(4). Consequently, with limited alternative 
sources of finance, aggregate demand will be affected and, subsequently, 
output and prices, although it has been argued that this channel could be 
weakening, since increasing disintermediation may be offering a wider 
range of financing opportunities to borrowers other than the access to the 
(3) Note that asymmetric information may not only underlie an 
underprovision of intermediated funds, but also of those directly raised 
in the capital markets. For instance, a healthy firm may retrench from 
issuing shares when, due to imperfect information about its financial 
position, the price it can obtain when selling the shares is lower than the 
one it could otherwise obtain in the absence of informational problems. 
,'J Alternatively, while· this class of borrowers might not be 
absolutely barred from bank lending, they might have to incur the costs 
of finding a new lender and, possibly, of higher interest rates, since the 
new lender does not have any information on the borrower's quality as 
such. 
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bank credit. 
The next section will focus more closely on the income and wealth 
effects on the financial position of private agents stemming from the 
impact of changes in interest rates on assets and liabilities and in asset 
prices . However, we will abstain from considerations related to the first 
step of the transmission process -the pass-through of changes in official 
interest rates to those relevant to the income and wealth effects-) as well 
as the final step: the impact of changes in current income and wealth on 
expenditure decisions, output and inflation . 
3. THE BALANCE-SHEET CHANNEL. 
The importance attributed to the balance-sheet channel in the 
transmission of monetary policy has increased in the recent past . On the 
one hand , this is the result of academic developments (such as those 
reviewed in the previous section) stressing the implications of asymmetric 
information between lenders and borrowers for the functioning of financial 
markets. More recently, the relevance of the channel operating through 
the agents' balance-sheets has been moved to the fore of monetary policy 
transmission discussions as the result of the perception that the financial 
position of private agents is likely to have played an important role in 
explaining the recession at the beginning of the current decade, with the 
explosion of the asset price bubble in a number of countries, particularly 
in the Anglo-Saxon economies , but also in Japa� and the Scandinavian 
countries . A tightening of monetary policy intended to offset inflationary 
pressures resulted in a sudden collapse of asset prices , which had 
formerly risen sharply in the wake of financial deregulation during the 
eighties . The financial position of the private agents worsened, as a 
result of the deterioration in balance-sheets following the drop in asset 
prices and the fall in cash-flow arising from factors such as the increa.se 
in variable-rate mortgage-related interest payments compounded with the 
previous over-indebtedness ensuing from financial deregulation . This 
worsened financial position contributed in all likelihood to sharpening the 
resulting recession in the early years of the current decade . 
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In fact, deregulation and other changes in financial markets suggest 
that the importance of the balance-sheet channel has probably increased 
in recent decades. For instance, disposable income of private agents must 
have become more sensitive to monetary policy since the deregulation of 
interest rates. This greater sensitivity of income should have induced a 
greater interest sensitivity of their expenditure, particularly if agents 
are liquidity-constrained, so that their current income plays a greater 
role in determining their spending decisions. Another reason would) in 
the case of households, be the increase in the share of variable-rate 
mortgages which would tend to provoke a reduction in spending whenever 
interest rates rise. 
To assess the relevance of the balance-sheet channel it is worth noting 
that the income effect arises through the impact of official interest rate 
movements on the returns and costs on financial assets and liabilities 
denominated in national currency, but also through its impact on the 
exchange rate, so that when a� increase (reduction) in official interest 
rates tends to put appreciating (depreciating) pressure on the national 
currency, the return and cost in domestic currency associated, 
respectively, with the assets and liabilities denominated in foreign 
currency will reduce (increase). Likewise, the wealth effect refers not 
only to the impact of monetary impulses on the market value of certain 
financial assets denominated in national currency (and also of real assets, 
such as housing), but also to its impact on the domestic currency market 
value of all foreign-currency-denominated financial assets and liabilities 
(which will reduce -increase- with the appreciation -depreciation- of the 
national currency). 
For a given response of market interest rates to official rates, the size 
of the income effect will depend, for financial instruments denominated in 
national currency, on the net interest-bearing asset position of agents, 
the composition of their assets and liabilities (in particular, the shares of 
instruments remunerated at fixed and variable rates and with short and 
long maturities) and, finally, agents' propensity to spend Qut of interest 
income. The latter factor, together with the level of assets and liabilities 
held by the private sector in foreign currency, will determine the size of 
the income effect derived from the impact of interest rate changes on the 
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exchange rate. In the same vein, the size of the wealth effect associated 
with those assets denominated in national currency will depend on their 
level and composition and the propensity to spend out of changes in net 
wealth. This second factor will also determine the wealth effect arising 
from financial instruments denominated in foreign currency J as well as the 
level of these assets and liabilities. Naturally, income and wealth effects 
will also rely on the extent to which lenders· reluctance to lend is 
affected by developments in the financial position of the borrowers. 
An important qualification to the extent of the income effect is the fact 
that the worsening interest flows from some agents should be 
counterbalanced by the improvements from others, since a financial asset 
is always the counterpart of another agent·s financial liability . However, 
this redistribution of income does not preclude the existence of an income 
effect. This is most clear when either the holder or the issuer of the 
instrument does not belong to the private non-financial sector(5). But 
even if both the issuer and the holder of a financial instrument belong to 
the non-financial private sector, a change in the interest income 
generated by that asset could generate an income effect (and hence impact 
on aggregate demand) provided that the propensities to spend out of 
interest income of both agents diverge or that lenders do not suffer credit 
constraints or do not have the same spending opportunities as the 
borrowers. In any event, these considerations will not apply to the wealth 
effects: whenever monetary policy is able to affect the prices of certain 
financial assets, their holders will consider this fact as a change in their 
wealth. However, the issuers' net wealth will be unaffected by price 
variations in the secondary market of the instruments they have 
(5) Although even in this case, the redistribution of income could 
end up taking place inside the non-financial private sector. If a 'credit 
institution is the issuer or the holder of the instrument, the change in its 
remuneration may merely result in a change in the dividends it distributes 
to its shareholders. If the issuer is the public sector, changes in the 
interest income of private agents might still not trigger income effects if 
these agents associate the change in their current income with a counter­
balancing change in future taxes, given the impact of changing interest 
payments on the public-sector balance. 
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previously issued(6). Consequently, while conceivably a part of the 
income effects may amount to a zero-sum game -in the sense that the total 
income of the non-financial private sector could remain unaffected-, 
changes in the asset price level will always generate genuine net wealth 
effects. 
The size and even the sign of the income and wealth effects arising in 
response to a change in the monetary policy stance diverge notably across 
the whole range of financial instruments. A description follows of the 
likely relevance of both effects for different categories of financial assets 
and liabilities held by the private non-financial sector. The classification 
is based on the categories usually contained in the national financial 
accounts. A summary is shown in table 1 ,  where a + (-) sign represents, 
for a given category of financial instrument, an income or wealth effect 
which tends to strengthen (weaken) the transmission of monetary 
impulses. A 0 (zero) is associated with a non-significant income or wealth 
effect for the transmission process of monetary policy arising from that 
particular financial instrument. 
As far as financial assets -from the point of view of their holders- are 
concerned, they are classified in the following eight categories: 
(a) Cash and sight deposits. Cash is obviously a non-interest-bearing 
asset, while sight deposits almost share in principle that condition with 
it, since their interest yield is very low and typically responds very little 
to changes in monetary conditions (although possibly this is not so clear­
cut in the case of Spain where sight deposits have strongly responded to 
changes in monetary conditions in recent years as a result of increased 
competition among financial intermediaries). Consequently, movements in 
official interest rates are assumed not to generate any income effects 
(6) A different matter is the fact that, in a second round of effects, 
when monetary impulses will affect the inflation rate, the real value of 
those financial instruments will be altered as will thus their issuers· and 
holders· net wealth. Besides, an additional income effect would also 
appear through the impact of monetary policy on the general price level 
at least for those instruments with fixed returns and a long-term maturity 
(and even in the case of short-term instruments, provided that the 
movement in the price level is not anticipated). 
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related to this category of assets . Since their face value will also remain 
unaffected, no wealth effect will exist either. 
(b) Other deposits and (c)  Short-time securities . In so far that 
monetary policy can affect the remuneration of this category of asset s ,  a 
rise in official interest rates will produce an increase in the income of 
those agents holding them, thus tending to impair the process of monetary 
transmission. This income effect running in the opposite direction to that 
desired by the central bank will be more relevant the shorter the average 
maturity of these types of instruments, so that contracts are reviewed 
more frequently. Since their nominal value will remain unaltered after a 
monetary shock, no wealth effect will be associated with these asset s .  
(d)  Bonds. For fixed-rate bonds,  while the income effect will tend to 
be zero -at least ,  in the short-run , as long as newly-issued bonds are not 
substituted for those maturing- , and more so , the longer the maturity of 
the securities concerned , the wealth effect will tend to run in the 
direction desired by the authorities, since increasing yields in the 
secondary market will be associated with decreasing prices: 
(e) Shares . No income effect is expected to show up in the short-run 
since nominal dividend yields will only possibly be affected at a later 
stage, if the monetary move results in a change in firms· profits in the 
opposite direction. The wealth effect will run in the same direction as in 
the case of the bonds. 
(f) Mutual fund certificates . The income and wealth effects arising from 
this type of asset may be seen to be dependent on the nature of the 
financial instruments in which the fund has invested its proceeds (money 
market assets versus longer .. term securities ,  shares and real estate) and 
on the nature of the returns that holders obtain (accumulated capital 
gains or losses when certificates are sold versus more or less regular 
payments stemming from the fund portfolio's income and capital gains ) .  
For those mutual funds in which earnings are reinvested (accumulation 
funds), no income effect will exis t .  As to the wealth effect ,  it will operate 
in the direction to -reinforce the monetary transmission in the case of 
- 18 -
capital-market and real-estate funds (since, along previous lines, the 
market value of securities and shares -and also real estate- will tend to 
decrease with increases in official interest rates) and will exert a 
counteracting effect -albeit rather limited- in the case of money market 
funds (whose asset yields will tend to increase). This interpretation of 
the income and wealth effects associated with money market funds of this 
type may be controversial. On the one hand, it hinges upon standard 
valuation rules: money market assets held by the fund are valued 
according to their acquisition price, while other assets are valued at their 
market prices. On the other hand, it can be argued that, since these 
certificates are very liquid assets (in the sense that they can be readily 
converted into cash at a low cost and without the risk of suffering capital 
losses), holders may understand a rise in the value of their certificates 
as an increase in income rather than as a capital gain. However, in the 
case of Spain (where the share of money market funds is very high) and, 
until June 1996, there were strong incentives to hold the certificates for 
a very long period of time to take full advantage of fiscal incentives. 
For those funds distributing earnings to the certificate holders 
("distribution" funds) and which invest in money market instruments, the 
income and wealth effects mentioned for this type of instrument apply. 
that is, no wealth effect will exist and the income effect will run in the 
opposite direction to the one desired by the monetary policy authorities. 
For capital markets and real estate funds, if just interest income and 
dividends were to be distributed, no significant income effect would arise 
if the portfolio composition remained constant, since the assets would 
have been acquired before the change in the monetary policy stance; the 
wealth effect will be favourable to the transmission of monetary policy. 
Matters are probably more complicated since, as one might expect, the 
composition of the portfolio is subject to continuous changes. If. 
however, these funds also distribute possible capital gains (as seems to 
be the case in Germany, in a proportion which is determined by the 
managers of the fund), an additional income effect is to be expected. Its 
nature might well be asymmetric in the sense that sinking interest rates 
would lead to higher distributed capital gains which would reinforce the 
monetary impulse. However, rising interest rates would be associated with 
(undistributed) capital losses, so that no additional income effect would 
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arise. As to the wealth effects, they would consequently be reduced in 
the first case, and unaffected in the second, in comparison to those funds 
which do not distribute their earnings. 
(g) Insurance reserves. In the case of households, insurance reserves 
are mainly composed of accumulated life insurance premia and 
contributions to retirement schemes, which do not yield any explicit 
regular returns. Consequently, no income effect is attached to this 
category of assets. However J since the portfolios of insurance and 
pension institutions will tend to be composed of shares and long-term 
securities J a significant wealth effect will exist, which will reinforce the 
monetary transmission process. 
(h) Claims denominated in foreign currency. In this case, income and 
wealth effects are not related to the impact of domestic monetary impulses 
on interest income and asset prices in foreign currency of those assets 
denominated in these currencies (which will tend to be negligible), but to 
their impact on the value in national currency of those assets and their 
income flows through the variations of the exchange rate. To this extent, 
the maturity of the claims will be irrelevant. Both the income and wealth 
effects will strengthen the monetary transmission process since, for 
instance, an appreciation of the exchange rate in the wake of a 
contractive monetary impulse will result in lower interest income and 
wealth when measured in the national currency. 
On the liabilities side of the balance-sheet, just income effects will be 
at play as previously mentioned, with the exception of wealth effects 
stemming from the liabilities in foreign currency. 
(a) Short-term securities(7). Income effects will tend to favour the 
process of monetary transmission, since higher (lower) interest payments 
will reduce (increase) the income of those agents issuing them. 
(b) Bonds and (c) Shares. As was seen when the asset side of the 
(7) Note that the categories of liabilities (a) to (c) are only issued 
by non-financial enterprises. 
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balance-sheet was reviewed, in principle no relevant income effects are 
associated with these instruments .  
( d )  Loans from financial institutions. Whenever official interest rates 
are able to affect the rates at which short-term loans are granted, 
debtors' interest payments will move in the same direction -and, 
consequently, their income, in the opposite one-, so that the transmission 
will be enhanced. However ,  these effects will be absent for longer-term 
loans , as long as they do not bear a variable rate . 
(e) Credit granted by non-financial enterprises to households and 
other firms . Although the average maturity of this type of credit will tend 
to be rather short , it is far from clear that the size of the income effect -
favourable anyway to the monetary transmission process- will be large, 
because it is likely that lenders will not fully adapt the terms of the credit 
they provide to the changes in official interest rates(S) . Information in 
this regard is typically scarce and precludes making any solid statements, 
but a faster adjustment of the rates at which credit is granted to 
households rather than to firms is conceivable , since the latter will be 
more based on long-term established commercial practices which are 
unlikely to be much a.ffected in the short-run by monetary policy 
movements .  
(f) Liabilities denominated in foreign currency. Contrary to the case 
of the claims , changes in the value of the national currency associated 
with monetary impulses will give rise to income and wealth effects that run 
against the authorities· intentions, since, for instance , an appreciating 
currency associated with a rise in official interest rates will reduce the 
national currency value of interest payments and debt liabilities 
denominated in foreign currency. 
It is likely that the perception of the fluctuations in income flows and 
in the price of assets -and , consequently, the income and wealth effects 
themselves- differs according to the type of instrument.  This fact is 
( 0) Implicitly, this assumes that, on the contrary, the pass-through 
to other sources of finance is complete (or, at least ,  significantly larger) . 
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themselves- differs according to the type of instrument.  This fact is 
probably more relevant as far as wealth effects are concerned. For 
instance, wealth effects associated with mutual fund certificates are likely 
to have particularly powerful effects on aggregate demand) since their 
holders receive regular information about the market value of their 
certificates . Information about the market value of shares is also typically 
very precise. However , in the case of bonds held directly by households,  
it  is  more unlikely that they will be equally conscious about the 
fluctuations in market prices. To some extent, this is possibly also the 
case for the accummulated contributions to retirement schemes . 
In general, the balance sheets of households and non-financial 
enterprises diverge in a way that tends to reflect their different role in 
economic activity and their differing degree of access to alternative 
sources of finance. This determines the net asset position of both sectors , 
as well as the predominant types of instruments and the mix of maturities 
in which they show up . In this respect, households are net lenders , while 
firms are net debtors . The non-financial enterprise sector has access to 
a wider range of financing possibilities , which should support , at least 
during periods of monetary contraction , the possibility of a greater 
incidence of monetary policy on households than on firms , if a bank 
lending channel were to exist or, alternatively, if the balance-sheet 
channel which relies on lenders' desire to lend were to show up primarily 
in intermediated finance , so that households would be more exposed to the 
fluctuations in its availability. 
4 .  A QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF THE RELATIVE SIZE OF THE 
BALANCE-SHEET CHANNEL IN GERMANY AND SPAIN. 
In this section , the composition of the sectoral balance sheets in both 
countries is compared , in order to point out those differences which are 
likely to have implications for the transmission of monetary policy . 
However , little attempt (if any) is made to explain how these differences 
might influence the behaviour of the different components of aggregate 
demand . 
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Real assets are not dealt with in depth . Indeed , the increase in the 
share of owner-occupied housing may constitute an important aspect in 
which the size of the wealth and income effects may have changed in 
recent years in the case of households . From the point of view of the 
financing of purchases through indebtedness, these changes are 
implicitly captured among variations in households' financial liabilities and 
interest payments . However, by leaving aside this important component 
of households' wealth, we miss an important aspect in which wealth 
effects are likely to operate. In any case, home ownership is much more 
widespread in Spain (78% of total dwellings) than in Germany (38%) . 
Among 12 industrialised countries considered , Spain and Germany are , 
respectively, those with the highest and lowest rates , the divergence 
being probably due to a different fiscal treatment of the purchase of 
owner-occupied homes in both countries . However, according to data from 
Dolado , Gonzalez-Paramo and Viftals ( 1 997) and Todter and Ziebarth 
( 1997) , the value of the stock of housing in terms of GDP is very similar 
in both countries ( 184% and 170% in Spain and Germany, respectively) ,  so 
that if the potential size of wealth effects is proxied by that ratio , it 
should not differ significantly among both countries . 
In order to obtain an approximation to the degree to which income and 
wealth effects are likely to operate, the main tools used are the financial 
accounts of the two countries. A comparison is made of aspects such as 
the overall level of net financial assets and gross financial assets and 
liabilities, the proportion of those assets whose market value is likely to 
be affected by mqnetary policy, the share of net interest-bearing assets 
and the proportion of interest receipts and payments in disposable 
income . Financial instruments included in the construction of these 
measures do not coincide precisely with those presumed to give rise to 
income and wealth effects in section 3 ,  due to limitations in the information 
provided in the financial accounts and to the need to improve 
comparability between both countries . The annex provides details on the 
adjustments made to the raw data . 
Some of the observed differences in the composition of private agents· 
portfolios can be attributed to factors such as differing preferences 
-possibly related to the inflation record of each country- or the incidence 
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of financial and· fiscal regulations . 
A good example of the influence of fiscal regulations on the financial 
structure is provided by the swift development in the nineties of 
accumulation fund certificates as a financial asset held by Spanish 
households,  given the favourable treatment of their capital gains . In 
Spain, capital income in excess of 28 , 000 pesetas (around 325 DM) per 
household is added to other sources of income and the prevailing 
progressive tax scale is applied to total income. On the other hand , 
capital gains were taxed between 1991 and June 1996 at a rate -different 
for alternative categories of assets- which was lower anyway , and more 
so the longer the household held the asset. Those capital gains arising 
from mutual funds were absolutely tax-exempt after 15 years . No wonder, 
then, that accumulation money market mutual funds grew so briskly in the 
nineties , since they emerged as a formidable competitor for bank deposits 
(in particular, for long-term deposits) as a way of maintaining wealth not 
necessarily held for spending purposes , but shielded anyway from 
fluctuations in market prices . The same reasons explain why 
"distribution" funds have not developed in Spain , and why funds 
investing in shares and longer-term securities have developed more slowly 
(at least unti1 1996)} since the risk of capital losses prevents them from 
adequately competing with bank deposits and other risk-free assets. The 
new fiscal regulations on capital gains in force since June 1996 scrapped 
the commensurate decrease in taxation with the number of years the asset 
was held and made taxes on capital gains unrelated to the level of income , 
by introducing a uniform tax rate of 20% provided that at least two years 
had elapsed between the purchase and sale of the asset . By eliminating 
the incentives to hold money market investment fund certificates for very 
long periods of time, their substitutability with bank deposits has even 
increased. 
Former studies related to the present one are Borio ( 1995) and 
Kneeshaw ( 1 995 ) ,  for a sample of industrialised countries , and Peftalosa 
( 1996 ) ,  for the case of Spain . Munoz de la Pena ( 1 997) reviews the 
existing empirical evidence concerning the relative potency of monetary 
policy transmission mechanisms in different European countries . As far 
as the steps not dealt with in the current study are concerned ,  the 
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following points are noteworthy concerning Germany and Spain . Firstly, 
movements in money market rates appear to be translated to long-term 
rates more swiftly and completely in Spain then in Germany(9) . 
Secondly , consumption seems to be more responsive to long-term rates in 
Spain, the opposite being true in the case of investment{ 10) .  Finally , 
moderately larger rigidities in Spain should favour greater real effects in 
this country and, correspondingly , should hinder more the transmission 
to prices. Overall, the transmission of monetary policy impulses seems to 
be more powerful in Spain than in Germany. 
4 . 1 . The financial position of households. 
Households' economic decisions comprise consumption spending, 
investment in housing and financial saving. However, in the Spanish. 
national accounts ,  individual firms are jointly considered with households 
for reasons related to the availability of information . This poses a 
potential problem when analy�ing the financial position of families , since 
their balance sheet will reflect. along with elements related purely to the 
above-mentioned decisions, others which will be closer related to 
decisions typically associated with non-financial enterprises . 
Economic theory suggests that households make their spending and 
saving decisions according not to their current but to their permanent 
income . If this were so, the room for monetary policy to affect aggregate 
demand would be reduced . If people know that the monetary policy stance 
is somehow related to the short-run performance of the economy (it is 
oriented , say, to offset inflationary pressures when they arise or to 
smooth cyclical fluctuations in real activity) ,  wealth and income effects 
would tend to cancel out in the course of economic cycles , so that they 
would not lead households to reassess their permanent income. Only 
" )  Sastre ( 1 996) finds an increase in the sensitivity of agents 1 
assets and liabilities rates to monetary conditions in Spain in the current 
decade . This appears to be associated with the liberalisalion of financial 
markets and the increased competition among financial intermediaries. 
( 10)  However, Estrada, Hernando and Valles ( 1 996) find a larger 
response by investment in Spain than former studies . 
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substitution-like effects would be operating when changes in official 
interest rates take place , to the extent that the relative price of current 
and future expenditure is affected . However, it is still likely that 
balance-sheet channels operate in the real world . First , consumer 
decisions may, at least partially, be based on current income if 
households misinterpret variations in current income and wealth as 
changes in permanent income, so that the balance-sheet channel operating 
through households' desire to spend would be in place. Secondly , there 
would always be room for the second type of balance-sheet channel -that 
working through the willingness of lenders (in this case mostly credit 
institutions) to lend- to operate : even if the fact that the effects of the 
monetary impulses will cancel out in the long-run may imply that the 
ability of the borrower to repay debt in the long-run may not be impaired , 
a worsening financial position in the time horizon of the maturity of the 
instrument will entail an increase in the likelihood of default. 
Consequently , households may find themselves liquidity-constrained 
whenever the value of the collateral they can offer is reduced or the 
burden of servicing the debt rises above a given share of current 
disposable income. 
Household balance sheets are characterised by a high positive net 
financial wealth (as a percentage of GDP) in both countries (chart 1 ) .  
Whereas in Spain it could be accepted, at first glance , that this ratio bas 
been moving around an average in 1986-95, in Germany it seems to move 
along an increasing path, although these divergent developments are 
likely to be dependent on the short time-span considered. The level 
reached in both countries nearly coincides since 1989 and approached 90% 
in 1995 . These similar levels of net financial wealth are the result of 
higher assets and liabilities in Germany (see chart 2) , which could reflect 
a larger degree of financial development. On the other hand, the higher 
rate of owner-occupied homes in Spain should be expected to be 
associated with a larger gross indebtedness (provided that the flow of 
new owners is also higher) . In any event , higher assets (as a proportion 
of GDP) in Germany indicate that households will tend to be less 
liquidity-constrained , since they can offer more collateral. 
In both countries , the fluctuations in net wealth are driven by 
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movements in financial assets . This fact allows for several alternative 
interpretations .  The most straightforward would be that some of the 
assets held by households are subject to changes in their market value , 
which is not the case for the liabilities (mainly, loans from financial 
institutions) .  Another possible interpretation is provided by Pefialosa 
( 1996) : this could highlight the fact that , whenever households modify 
their spending and saving decisions, they do so by adjusting their assets 
and not their liabilities (possibly because they try to circumvent possible 
liquidity constraints -induced by the lenders' desire not to increase their 
lending above a certain level- through the shedding of assets ) .  While the 
first explanation relies on asset price changes .(possibly as a result of 
monetary policy itself) , the latter hinges upon quantity adjustments (as 
a result of agents' reaction to monetary policy) . 
Chart 3 tries to shed some light on this issue. The chart shows the 
variations in net assets together with those of gross assets and liabilities 
(all of them measured as the change in the ratio of the relevant stock 
variable to GDP ) ( 11 ) .  It is again confirmed that , in both countries ,  
households' wealth adjustments take place mostly through variations in 
assets, but it seems difficult to use this information in order to evaluate 
the existence of borrowing constraints . If they were to exist , a negative 
variation in net assets to GDP in a given period (a reduction in net 
financial wealth) would tend to be translated to a reduction in the assets 
rather than an increase in the liabilities .  The former seems to be 
observed , but it is difficult to explain why, in those periods,  liabilities 
also tend to fall in Germany. On the other hand, in those periods in which 
the variation in net assets to GDP is positive, the variations in both 
assets and liabilities also tend to be positive, which might indicate that 
the increase in assets allows for more collateral to be used to engage in 
new liabilities .  
I n  principle, a competing explanation for the reduction in assets when 
households decide to increase their net indebtedness, could be the 
( 11)  An alternative could have been to present the flows scaled 
by GDP. Flows , unlike the variations in the stocks , are free from changes 
in the value of the financial instruments . 
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decision of households to finance spending out of existing assets on the 
grounds of their lower average return as compared to the cost of 
incurring new liabilities . However, this reasoning fails to explain why, 
when spending is low and thus households t net financial wealth tends to 
increase, they do not do so by reducing their liabilities instead of 
accumulating new assets (unless one is ready to accept that , in periods 
of interest rate increases, the transmission of monetary impulses to the 
interest rates on assets is more intense than that to those on liabilities or 
that there are costs associated with cancelling some liabilities -for 
instance , a mortgage- ) .  
In what follows , no income and wealth effects associated with the 
positions in foreign currency are considered separately , but rather they 
are included under the headings ·Other assets" and ·Other liabilities·. 
The reason is the small size of the assets and liabilities held by the 
households of both countries against the rest of the world -identified ,  in 
this paper, for reasons of data availability , with those instruments 
denominated in foreign currency- .  
4 . 1.1. Wealth effects(12 ) .  
Examining the categories of domestic currency assets subject t o  wealth 
effects scaled by GDP (see table 2) suggests a quite larger potential size 
of the wealth effects in Germany than in Spain (75 . 7% and 37 . 3% in 1995, 
respectively) . The difference remains large when the joint share of assets 
subject to wealth effects in total households' assets is considered , which 
can probably be attributed , at least partially , to the German stability 
record , which leads borrowers and lenders to engage more actively in 
long-term financing relationships . It is also worth underlining that the 
proportions have been steadily increasing in both countries in recent 
years , which points towards a strengthening of the balance-sheet channel 
of monetary transmission. 
Among the individual categories of assets, the quite different role 
( 12)  In section 2 of the annex it  is explained which categories of assets 
are considered to be subject to these effects.  
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played by bond holdings in the portfolios of German and Spanish 
households ( chart 4 )  is remarkable. While in the first case they have 
remained stable during the period considered at around 15% of their total 
financial assets (which represents an increasing proportion of GDP until 
rising above 21% in 1995 ) , Spanish households hold an ever-decreasing 
proportion of this type of assets (in 1995 , 2 . 5% of total assets or 3 . 2% of 
GOP compared to 7 . 3  and 8 . 4  % ,  respectively, in 1986) . To the extent that 
rising short term interest rates are transmitted to the longer end of the 
yield curve and result in market price declines in these assets (and 
subsequently in a reduction of households' wealth) ,  this provides a 
source for a reinforced transmission of monetary policy impulses in 
Germany compared to Spain. (ll) 
Another component where a sizeable difference can be observed is 
insurance reserves (in 1995, 27 . 5% of total household assets in Germany 
compared to 1 1 .  7% in Spain) . The high level in Germany might seem 
surprising given that the coverage of public pension schemes should be 
at least as large as in Spain . However, while the share has remained very 
stable in Germany , Spain is very rapidly catching up (these assets were 
below 3% of total assets in 1986 ) .  
Differences are smaller concerning shares and mutual fund certificates 
held.  Their participation in total assets is, in both cases , larger in Spain. 
This may reflect, in the first case, the much-quoted traditional reluctance 
of German households to invest in shares and, in the second one, the 
favourable treatment of capital gains derived from mutual fund certificates 
in Spain( 14 ) ,  
Ill) Note also that, given that the increasing integration of world 
capital markets has led, in recent years , to an increased correlation in 
bond prices across different markets, the larger proportion of bonds in 
the portfolios of German households tends to make this component of their 
wealth more sensitive to external shocks , which are not under the control 
of the national monetary authorities . On the other hand , it is also true 
that Spanish bond markets are likely to be more sensitive to such shocks 
than German ones , 
( 14)  However, note that money market funds -assumed either not to be 
subject to wealth effects or to give rise to wealth effects with an opposite 
sign- are included in charts 4 and 5 with all other mutual funds.  This 
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4 . 1 .2.  Income effects . 
In what follows, an attempt is made to approximate the potential for 
these effects. Several indicators are used for this purpose: the 
proportions in G DP and in household portfolios of those assets and 
liabilities whose returns are likely to respond to movements in official 
rates, the interest receipts and payments made and the implicit interest 
rates on the assets and liabilities which give rise to the income effects . 
Section 3 of the annex provides details on the precise choice of 
instruments used in the construction of these measures . In particular, 
since it is not possible to approximate those short-term instruments 
potentially subject to income effects in the Spanish case, a broader 
measure including longer-term interest-bearing assets and liabilities is 
also provided. 
Net interest-bearing assets broadly defined have trended upwards in 
the case of Germany, as a share of GDP, since 1986 ( 25 . 5%) to represent 
about 31% in 1995 (table 3 ) .  As in the case of total assets and liabilities , 
this upward trend results more Crom the expansion oC interest-bearing 
assets than Crom a reduction oC the corresponding liabilities . In Spain , 
results are quite diCCerent: while net interest-bearing assets amounted to 
45 . 1% of GDP in 1986, they were just 26.6% in 1 995. These developments 
might be partially driven by two main forces : the booming investment in 
housing in the second half of the eighties, which pushed up the demand 
Cor loans from financial institutions, and the strong expan,sion of mutual 
funds previously analysed, which do not distribute any yields to their 
holders . 
Under the narrower definition of financial instruments potentially 
class of fund is particularly relevant in Spain (55% of the portfolio of all 
mutual funds in 1995 ) .  In Germany, where they were first introduced in 
1994, they accounted in 1995 for about 13% of the value of all 
participations in those Cunds in which individual investors can acquire 
certificates ( " PublikumsConds") . Furthermore , assets of real estate funds 
-negligible in Spain- amounted in Germany at the end of 1995 to about 24% 
oC total assets oC investment Cunds . 
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subject to income effects developed in the annex , interest-bearing assets 
as a percentage of GDP reached quite similar levels in 1995 in both 
countries (54 . 7% in Spain and 47 . 9% in Germany, in both cases declining 
from 60% and 54 .5%, respectively, in 1986 ) .  Net interest-bearing assets 
(that is, the above defined interest-bearing assets less short-term loans 
from financial institutions )  can be calculated just for Germany. They 
stood in 1995 at 44.8% of GDP ( down from 50.8% in 1986 ) .  
These indicators point towards a strong potential for income effects -
although somewhat diminishing- , which would run in the opposite 
direction to that desired by monetary authorities : that is,  given that 
monetary policy can affect the interest rates associated with the financial 
assets and liabilities held by the households and that it does so to a 
uniform extent across the whole range of these instrument s ,  an increase 
in official interest rates would lead to higher interest income and 
expenditure by these agents. 
A rough measure of the size of the income effect can be established by 
assuming that the pass-through from official rates to the conditions in 
which interest-bearing assets and liabilities are remunerated is complete 
and instantaneous (so that a change in the former is translated in its 
entirety to the latter) . If this were so, the change in households' income 
when the broader measure is used (which seems to be less correct, but 
allows for a comparison between both countries ) ,  would be 0. 47% and 
0 . 38% in terms of households' disposable income in 1995, respectively, for 
Germany and Spain , for a 1 p . p .  change in interest rates . So, the 
difference among both countries would be small. The range in which these 
figures have moved between 1986 and 1995 is not very large , reflecting 
the relative stability of net interest-bearing assets. Needless to say , one 
needs to be extremely cautious when interpreting such an exercise. Apart 
from the difficulties in constructing the interest-bearing aggregates ,  
some important caveats follow. Firstly, no attempt is made to check 
whether the assumption of perfect transmission from official to market 
rates holds.  Should the transmission be higher in the case of the liabilities 
(assets) ,  the corresponding figure would be reduced (increased) .  In 
fact , Escriva and Haldane (1994) find that , for Spanish households ,  
income effects run initially in' the opposite direction, given the swifter 
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response in credit rates . However, later, when the remuneration of the 
assets held against banks is updated , the sign of income effects is 
reversed . Secondly , the shares of interest-bearing assets and liabilities 
in GDP or disposable income are themselves endogenous to the rates of 
return on different instruments . Finally, those figures say little about 
the impact of the income effect on aggregate expenditure, since we do not 
know about the propensity to spend out of interest income (which may 
anyway be greater for those agents who are indebted in net terms than 
for those holding a net interest ... bearing asset position) and about the 
possible extent of liquidity contraints imposed by lending institutions .  
Another way of looking at the income effects relies on focusing on 
effective interest receipts and payments -as provided by the income 
account of the national accounts'" in relation to disposable income. The 
problem encountered here is that the income account does not provide 
information about the interest income stemming from individual financial 
instruments, so that payments and receipts corresponding to short-term 
instruments can not be split from the aggregates ( see section 3 in the 
annex ) .  In contrast with the bulky net interest ... bearing asset position, 
net interest income does not represent in either country an important 
contribution to households· disposable income . To a certain extent , this 
corresponds to the fact that the cost of the liabilities is higher than the 
return on the assets, which partly offsets the existence of a net asset 
position. In 1994 (the latest period for which information for both 
countries is available) ,  net interest income amounted to 1 . 7  and 2 . 6% of 
disposable income in Germany and Spain, respectively (table 4 ) . The 
range of variation is not negligible (between 2 . 4  and 4 . 4% in Germany and 
between 2 . 8  and 4 . 8% -in 1995- in Spain) .  Charts 5 and 6 show interest 
receipts and payments (as a percentage of disposable income) , together 
with the implicit interest rates on assets and liabilities . The�e are 
constructed by dividing interest receipts and payments through those 
financial instruments from which they originate . In both countries ,  
fluctuations in the ratios of interest payments to disposable income are 
tracked quite well by the movements in their implicit cost, so that the 
former are not just explained by variations in the ratios of assets and 
liabilities to disposable income. Interest receipts as a share of disposable 
income are less well correlated with their remuneration . Finally, higher 
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net interest receipts in Spain result from relative lower implicit rates and 
higher interest-bearing assets and liabilities in Germany. 
4 . 1 . 3 .  Availability of nnance from credit institutions and other 
sources. 
It  has been previously argued that the balance-sheet channel of 
monetary policy transmission operates not only when a worsening financial 
position of private agents (in this case, of households) induced by a 
monetary tightening makes them more reluctant to spend but also when it 
makes lenders more reluctant to grant credit to those agents. In 
principle, the latter mechanism could equally apply to any category of 
lenders . However, it might be argued that the lending policy of financial 
institutions could react to the changing financial position of the borrowers 
more forcefully than that of other lenders (because , say, they are more 
aware of those changes since they have better information) . 
If this were so , reduced lending from financial institutions could be 
compensated by the availability of other sources of finance . However, this 
is unlikely to be the case for private households (see chart 7) . First,  
they cannot raise any funds in money or capital markets since lenders do 
not possess any information about their quality as borrowers . Besides, 
. according to the financial accounts, finance from foreign lenders is very 
low ( Spain) or either inexistent or not shown up separately ( Germany) .  
Finally, although credit from non-financial enterprises (here shown 
among ·Other liabilities") has a somewhat larger significance , it is 
impossible to disentangle -in the case of Spain- how it is split between 
individual enterprises included among households and households 
themselves . Anyway, even if retail credit may be a source of finance of 
some importance for households, it can never replace bank finance for 
decisions such as investment in housing. All in all, it seems to be a rather 
well established conclusion that households hardly have any relevant 
alternative to credit from financial institutions, so that whenever this 
becomes restricted, they may have to renounce some spending decisions 
requiring external finance. Constraints on the amount of credit obtained 
from financial institutions may depend on the purpose for which funds are 
raised. For ins tance, they could be less severe when funds are devoted 
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to the purchase of cars , since the value of the collateral would not be 
affected by the cycle. 
4 . 2 .  The financial position of non-financial enterprises . 
Firms contribute to aggregate demand by investing in capital goods.  
Decisions on fixed capital investment are based on comparing the cost of 
installing new capital with the stream of expected future profits 
associated with it. Apart from depreciation and fiscal factors , the cost of 
capital includes the cost of financing the· investment projects as measured 
either through the cost of rising the funds in the financial markets (for 
instance , interest paid on loans) or, if investment is financed out of 
existing profits, through the forgone interest income the firm could have 
obtained from acquiring financial assets . 
According to the neoclassical paradigm , whenever a firm wants to incur 
the cost of capital , financial markets will make the funds available, so that 
it will be irrelevant to finance investment decisions out of ·own resources 
or external fund s .  However, in the real world , firms may face constraints 
on the amount of funds they can obtain from financial markets, so that 
investment may be then limited by their profits. These constraints 
influence the investment behaviour of non-financial enterprises in the 
same way as liquidity constraints influence the spending behaviour of 
households .  If monetary policy is able to affect negatively the value of the 
firm and its profits -by putting downward pressure on the firm's asset 
prices and net interest income- ,  investment will tend to be based to a 
greater extent on current cash-flow rather than expected future profits 
in the same way as households base their expenditure on current -a�d not 
permanent- income. Again ,  this can happen through two different ways:  
a worsened financial position will make lenders more reluctant to provide 
funds to firms , and -although possibly less conceivably than in the case 
of households- it might make firms retrench from engaging themselves in 
new investment projects (in the way that the need to improve balance 
sheets in Japan has prevented firms from investing during the nineties) . 
Non-financial enterprises are characterised by a negative net financial 
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wealth as a share of GDP ( chart 8 ) 1 1S) . Starting from similar positions 
at tht?: beginning of the period considered , German firms were 
considerably less indebted , in net terms , in 1995, mainly as a result of an 
increase in the value of their assets . At first glance , it seems that, in 
both countries , net financial wealth shows a greater volatility than its two 
components ( chart 9 ) .  Chart 10 shows the variations in the ratios of net 
assets and gross assets and liabilities to GDP. While the evidence should 
be viewed with caution, it seems that Spanish firms tend to adjust their 
net financial wealth through variations in their liabilities to a greater 
extent than their German counterparts ,  for which the burden of the 
adjustment falls primarily on gross assets . This could be consistent with 
the possibility that, in Germany, firms have less access to external 
sources of finance than they would wish . 
Separate wealth and income effects associated with financial 
instruments denominated in foreign currency are considered . However, 
holdings of these assets and liabilities are not shown separately in the 
financial accounts of Germany . For this reason, it is assumed that they 
coincide with claims and liabilities against non-residents ,  for which 
information exists ( see annex ) .  
4 . 2 . 1 .  Wealth effects. 
Domestic assets subject to wealth effects represent a lower proportion ,  
either of total assets or of GDP , than in the case of households ( table 5 ;  
upper half) , so that the potential importance of the balance-sheet 
transmission channel of monetary policy which relies on the impact of 
official interest rates on the prices of assets is lower for firms than for 
families in both countries . However, these wealth effects -tending to 
reinforce the transmission of monetary impulses- show two features in 
common with the case of households. On the one hand , their relevance has 
been trending upwards during the period considered in both countries 
( 15 ) Shares are excluded among the liabilities when calculating the net 
financial wealth of non-financial enterprises, since they represent 
precisely the market valuation of a firm, which is an alternative to its 
balance-sheet value ( that is , the difference between the value of its 
financial and real assets and the value of its financial liabilities) . 
- 35 -
(especially in Germany) .  On the other hand, they are greater in the case 
of German firms , as a result of larger holdings of bonds and, 
particularly , shares -which possibly reflects a greater degree of cross­
share holding in the case of Germany- (chart 1 1 )  . 
The net asset position of the corporate sector against non-residents 
does not only show a strong divergence ; this has also tended to increase 
quite markedly during the period considered ( see the lower part of table 
5 ) .  The signs of the wealth effects run in opposite directions: consider 
for instance, an upward move in official interest rates resulting in an 
appreciation of the domestic exchange rate. This will induce a reduction 
in the value of all claims and liabilities against non-residents when 
measured in the national currency. Since Spanish firms run a net debtor 
position, their wealth will increase, thus contributing to offset the 
monetary impulse . On the contrary , a similar tightening in German 
monetary policy would reduce the value of the net assets held against 
non-residents, inducing consequently a wealth effect which runs in the 
direction desired by monetary policy . 
It is difficult to tell how these conclusions are modified when the real 
case is considered , in which financial claims and liabilities denominated 
in foreign currency do not coincide with those against non-residents.  If 
it were true that the former are a sub-set of the latter, for those 
instruments held against non-residents but denominated in domestic 
currency, the liabilities would not be subject to any wealth effect , while 
the assets will be subject to it depending on their nature. In particular, 
it seems likely that , in the German case, a higher share of the net assets 
held against non-residents corresponds in fact to financial instruI?ents 
denominated in domestic currency, given the role played in the 
international monetary system by the Deutsche Mark. 
Finally , under the hypothesis that foreign-currency denominated 
instruments are exactly those held against non-residents and that there 
is a 1% appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate of the domestic 
currency against a basket of currencies with an equal composition to that 
of the respective net external positions of the non-financial enterprises' 
sectors of both countries , their net wealth would have been affected in 
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1986-95 by between 0 . 05 and 0 . 08% of GOP in the case of Germany and 
between -0.08 and -0. 15% in the case of Spain . 
4 . 2 . 2 .  Income effects . 
,As in the case of households, an attempt to ascertain the potential for 
income effects is made thr�ugh two different ways : an analysis of the 
weight in the balance sheets of firms of those instruments from which 
these effects are presumed to arise and the consideration of the flows of 
interest paid and received together with the underlying average interest 
rates on interest-bearing assets and liabilities . 
Firstly , for those instruments held against residents subject to income 
effects , the narrower and broader definitions from the annex are applied. 
Under the broad definition, net interest-bearing liabilities of non­
financial enterprises amounted in 1995 in Germany and Spain , 
respectively, to 50 . 7  and 29 .5% of GDP, so that , if this measure were to 
approximate correctly the potential for income effects , they would run in 
both cases in the direction desired by monetary policy, although with a 
larger size in the case of Germany (table 6 ) .  Besides , the net interest­
bearing liabilities have been slightly increasing in Germany over the 
period considered , while they have moved on a declining path in Spain . 
When only interest-yielding instruments with a short maturity are 
considered (the narrower definition) ,  the potential for income effects 
reduces drastically in Germany -the net debtor position amounts to only 
about 10% of GOP- , given the large weight of long-term loans from 
financial institutions among the sources of finance for German firms 
(around 40% of GOP or of all liabilities) . 
If a 1% increase in official interest rates in 1995 were to be fully and 
instantaneously transmitted to the interest rates of all domestic-currency 
denominated interest-bearing claims and liabilities , the additional net 
payments of German and Spanish firms would have amounted , under the 
broadly-defined interest-yielding instruments ,  to -5 . 0% and - 2 . 3% in 
terms of their disposable income , respectively-. Measured against the 
latter, the effect would have fluctuated between -4 . 4% and -6 . 5% in the 
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period from 1986 to 1995 in Germany and between - 2 . 3% and - 3 . 9% in 
Spain . This rough estimate suggests that the size of income effects could 
be rather large . 
Unfortunately, not much can be said concerning the size of the 
instruments denominated in foreign currency from which income effects 
arise, since it is unknown which foreign assets and liabilities give rise to 
income flows . If it were assumed that the net positions in these 
instruments correspond to the total net positions against non .. residents ,  
the conclusions would be analogous to those referring to the wealth 
effects, namely the net creditor position would tend to strengthen the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Germany, while the net 
debtor position would tend to weaken it in Spain . In any case, the impact 
on the sector's income would be of a limited size (naturally of a much lower 
magnitude than the impact on its wealth, under any plausible assumptions 
about the yields from these financial instruments) . 
Net interest payments represent not only an important proportion both 
of non-financial enterprises' disposable income and of GDP , but also a 
quite volatile one. This highlights the ability of these agents to become 
. indebted and the vulnerability of their cash-flows to changes in interest 
rates . Net interest payments of Spanish firms have remained notably 
higher up to around 1992 than those of German firms , but since then have 
tended to draw very much closer to each other (table 7) . Since 
remunerated net liabilities as a share of disposable income have remained 
higher in Germany during most of the period , greater net interest 
payments in Spain during the second half of the eighties must be 
explained by higher levels of interest rates on both remunerated assets 
and liabilities , by a higher differential between both or by a combination 
of these two possibilities. 
In charts 12 and 1 3 ,  the shares in disposable income of interest 
receipts and payments are depicted ,  for both Germany and Spain, along 
with the implicit interest rates on remunerated assets and liabilities­
calculated as the ratio between interest receipts and payments , 
respectively, and the corresponding remunerated assets and liabilities - .  
The differential between both implicit interest rates was higher in Spain 
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at the beginning of the period considered and has since shown a tendency 
a to converge to the German one (albeit with fluctuations ) ,  Also, the 
levels of these implicit rates have tended to approximate in both countries 
over time, These two developments combined help to explain why net 
interest payments (as a percentage of disposable income) have converged 
towards similar levels in 1994, so that if these ratios were good indicators 
of the extent of income effects in the transmission of monetary policy 
impulses to firms , no &ignificant differences would exist at the present 
moment( 16 ) , 
Some overall trend towards convergence of the rates on assets and 
liabilities can be observed , This may be attributed to heightening banking 
competition and improving efficiency in the financial markets and, on the 
side of firms , possibly to better cash-flow management. 
Finally, in Germany the implicit rates seem to track more closely the 
ratios of interest payments and receipts to disposable income, whereas the 
interest-bearing assets and liabilities of Spanish firms are more 
independent of their remuneration, which may imply that their investment 
is not so sensitive to the cost of capital .  
I t  would be interesting to see whether a more restrictive monetary 
{ 16J While it must be essentially true that, given that firms' net 
debtor positions have remained relatively stable in both countries and at 
a somewhat higher level in Germany J convergence must be the result of 
an approximation in both the differentials between the implicit cost and 
return and their levels J these results should be handled with care ,. First , 
it is somewhat puzzling that the interest rates calculated (particularly the 
return on remunerated assets) tend to show a larger fluctuation in 
Germany than in Spain which , assuming movements of similar intensity in 
market rates in both countries (which is also probably not true) , seems 
at odds with the presumably longer average maturity of German financial 
instruments ,  Besides , the tiny differential between the rates on assets 
and liabilities in Germany in 1991 suggests that the choice of instruments 
involved in their calculation might not be capturing those really involved 
in · the generation of such financial flows, However, in the wake of the 
German reunification , money market rates reached their highest level in 
1992 (while long-term market rates peaked around 1991 ) .  Chart 14 seems 
to suggest then that interest-bearing assets tend to have a shorter 
maturity than the corresponding liabilities , which seems plausible, 
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policy stance were able to reduce the availability of external finance. If 
monetary policy is able to affect the cost of external sources of finance 
and thus the cost of capital , it will also alter the level of investment 
desired by firms . Surely an increase in interest rates will also reduce the 
availability of internal finance, since the cash flow generated by firms will 
be lower, given not only the reduced operating surplus (induced by lower 
sales combined with initially fixed costs) ,  but also the net debtor position 
and the positive differential between the cost of liabilities and the return 
on assets.  What remains to be seen is whether a rise in interest rates will 
also reduce the availability of external sources of finance and whether 
this reduction is larger then the fall in desired investment, so that firms 
are liquidity-constrained . 
Chart 1 4 ,  which shows the investment-to-GDP ratio and the self­
financing rate of investment (saving plus net capital transfers divided by 
investment ) ,  tries to provide some -very tentative- evidence iIi this 
regard. The main problem in interpreting the chart is that it is unknown 
whether the investment used to calculate both ratios coincides with 
desired investment, or whether it is somewhat lower, due to restricted 
access to external finance . However, if the self-financing rate in a given 
period is above 100%, there may be firms whose investment is constrained 
by the unavailability of finance , but on the aggregate, observed 
expenditure on fixed capital will tend to coincide with that desired by the 
sector . 
In Spain , in those periods in which investment-to-GDP is lower, the 
own resources generated by firms more than suffice to finance their 
investment spending. This is not true for those periods in which 
investment as a proportion of GDP is higher , but then it is likely that the 
cost of capital will tend to be low, the financial situation of firms 
healthier , and the availability of external finance higher . Consequently, 
no evidence of borrowing constraints is found , although this assertion 
should be taken most cautiously, given the nature of the evidence 
provided . 
In Germany, the self-financing rate tends on average to be lower and 
does not cover observed investment in any period but the latest. 
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Particularly, in recent years ( 1 993-94 ) ,  the self-financing rate stood at 
comparatively low levels in relation to those attained in periods with 
similar low rates of investment (around 1986-88 ) .  The fall in t.he self­
financing rate can be assumed to be due to German reunification . 
However ,  whether this reflects borrowing constraints (possibly affecting 
East German enterprises) remains an open question, given the nature of 
the evidence provided . 
4 . 2 . 3 .  Availability of finance from credit institutions and other 
sources. 
In the event of a worsening of their financial position, firms are in a 
better situation than households to substitute other sources of finance for 
loans from financial institutions if these react by reducing their supply 
of loanable funds. Firms have access to the capital markets through the 
issue of shares or commercial paper and other longer-term securities , 
they may make a more active use of trade credit when resorting to credit 
from financial institutions becomes more difficult and, finally, they are 
also more likely to make use of the possibility of raising funds abroad . 
However, the first of these alternatives (direct access to credit 
markets through the issue of shares or debt securities) is unlikely to be 
at the disposal of all firms on an equal footing. The nature of the function 
performed by financial institutions, when they solve information problems 
about the quality of the borrowers through risk diversification, suggests 
that the smaller a firm is , the harder its access to disintermediated 
finance will be, since information about the firm will be more scarce and 
more costly to obtain. In principle t very small firms will have as little 
access to disintermediated funds as households ( 17 ) .  
I n  the aggregate, the dependence of firms on finance from credit 
institutions has evolved in a different way in both countries . According 
(17) Nevertheless , for Spain , the data available from the Central 
Balance Sheet Office concerning the balance-sheet structure of firms 
according to their size does not provide evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that smaller firms are more dependent on finance from credit 
institutions. 
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to the financial accounts, these liabilities have been falling in Spain from 
45 . 1% of total liabilities in 1986 to 39 . 2% in 1995 ; in Germany ,  they 
increased from 49 .4% to 52.  7% in the same period (chart 1 5 ) . Probably, the 
reduction in Spain can be partially attributed to the development of 
financial markets during these years . To some extent , the higher reliance 
of German firms on intermediated finance may reflect the traditional 
strong ties among financial institutions and the enterprise sector. 
Otherwise, differences among both countries are difficult to explain in 
terms of the relative importance of small and medium-sized firms in the 
industry, which is very high in both cases. 
Issued shares accounted in recent years for around one quarter of all 
liabilities in both countries . This proportion has remained quite stable in 
spite of valuation effects . Through the issue of commercial paper and 
bonds, large and solvent firms will be able to appropriate at least part of 
the margins of financial intermediation . Firms not fulfilling those 
requirements will have to renounce this source of finance , since its cost 
will be higher than that of banking finance or, more likely, they will not 
have access to it . This source of external finance has been more important 
in Spain than in Germany in the period considered , although the 
proportions in total liabilities have tended to converge ( 4 . 8% versus 3 . 3% 
in 1995 ) .  Hernando ( 1996) finds that , in Spain , when monetary policy 
becomes more restrictive , the increase in the cost of bank credit is larger 
than that of commercial paper . 
The importance of finance obtained abroad -probably mainly 
denominated in foreign currency- has increased in recent years as a 
result of the development of instruments to hedge against exchange rate 
risk . Finally, access to the remaining source of finance -trade credit 
among firms- is less likely to be restricted to larger firms . While the 
purpose of this sort of credit is to finance trade operations , under certain 
circumstances it can play an important role among the sources of finance 
of the firms receiving it (for instance, when unwanted inventories pile 
up) .  The German financial accounts do not provide any data on trade 
credit among firms. Although the Spanish financial accounts provide this 
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information( 18 ) ,  it has been preferred here to leave it aside in order to 
improve the comparability of the information presented for both countries . 
It is in any case worth noting that, in Spain , the proportion of trade 
credit outstanding among firms has tended to remain constant as a 
proportion of total assets or liabilities . This might indicate the continuing 
need to resort to this alternative source of finance in the face of the 
persistence of restrictions on the credit extended by financial 
intermediaries , and in spite of the fact that, if it were true that this type 
of credit yields a low interest -as it is frequently assumed- lending firms 
might be willing to reduce the amount of credit granted. 
5 .  CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE EXERCISE. 
Knowledge about the precise mechanisms through which monetary 
policy exerts its influence on the final variables is limited . Traditionally, 
the transmission of monetary impulses has been considered to rely upon 
the substitution of demand between different periods or countries , 
induced by changes in interest rates . Recently, more attention has been 
paid to the role played in the process by certain financial issues . In 
particular. the balance-sheet channel of monetary policy transmission 
refers to the impact of monetary-policy-induced changes in the financial 
position of private agents on their willingness to spend and on the 
willingness of lenders to finance their expenditure. 
As a result of official interest rate movements, two different types of 
effects on the financial position of private agents (and thus on their 
aggregate expenditure) are expected to emerge : wealth effects -which 
arise through changes in asset prices and in the domestic currency value 
of foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities- and income effects 
-which stem from changes in the net interest income flows associated with 
the movements in the remuneration of interest-yielding financial 
instruments and with the national currency value of the flows denominated 
(is) Which is estimated on the basis of the information existing for the 
sample of firms covered by the Banco de Espafia Central Balance-Sheet 
Office . 
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in foreign currency - .  
The paper tries t o  identify differences in the relevance o f  the balance­
sheet channel in Germany and Spain . The scope of the methodology 
employed is rather limited : national financial accounts are used in order 
to point out those differences in the structure of the balance sheets of the 
households and firms of both countries which are presumed to give rise 
to divergent income and wealth effects. However, this information has a 
limited say on the real potency of this transmission channel of monetary 
policy, since important steps of the mechanism are omitted . Aspects not 
dealt with incl �..lde the response of asset price.s ,  the interest rates of the 
different instruments and the exchange rate to monetary impulses, the 
impact of the variations in income and wealth on aggregate demand and the 
transmission of the variations in aggregate demand to prices and output 
(which will hinge upon such issues as institutional arrangements in the 
labour markets ) .  Consequently, as no attempt is made to quantify the 
relevance of the balance-sheet channel in terms of the final impact of 
official rate movements on output and prices, and as the qualitative 
analysis is , moreover, rather limited, the conclusions drawn must be 
regarded as rather tentative. 
The evidence forwarded points towards a smaller size in both countries 
in the potential strength of the balance-sheet channel in the case of 
households than in the case of firms (see tables 8 and 9 ) .  By their very 
nature, wealth effects arising from domestic currency denominated assets 
held by households run always in the direction desired by policymakers, 
tending to strengthen the transmission of monetary impulses . Also, since 
households are net creditors in interest-yielding instruments denominated 
in the national currency , the associated income effects run against the 
policymakers' intentions, thus offsetting possible wealth effects . Finally, 
households' position in foreign currency is very · reduced , so that no 
significant income or wealth effects are to be expected to arise from such 
financial instruments . Given the opposite signs of the expected domestic 
currency wealth and income effects , it appears that the joint size of the 
effects could be rather limited .  
The non-financial enterprises of both countries hold net liabilities in 
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interest-yielding instruments denominated in national currency , so that 
their" net interest payments move in tune with changes in official interest 
rates, thus reinforcing monetary policy impulses . The size of these 
income effects seems to be rather large , as indicated by the proportion of 
these net liabilities to GDP and the large weight of net interest payments 
in the firms' disposable income . They seem to be more relevant in 
Germany, although the latter ratio has tended to converge in recent 
periods .  German and Spanish firms hold, respectively, net creditor and 
debtor positions in foreign currency assets (identified as those held 
against non-residents) , so that the valuation effects arising from 
movements in the domestic exchange rate in response to monetary policy 
reinforce, in the first case , and weaken, in the second, the transmission 
of the monetary impulse. This fact, together with the signs pointing to 
l a r g e r  w e a l t h  a n d  i n c o m e  e f f e c t s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
domestic-currency-denominated instruments in Germany, leads to the 
conclusion that the balance-sheet channel is stroI,ger in this country, as 
far as firms are concerned . 
Broadly considered, developments in balance sheets have tended to be 
more stable in Germany than in Spain. This fits in well with the a priori 
perception that the speed at which financial innovations have developed 
could well been have larger in Spain, for reasons connec:ted to the 
persistence of systematically larger and mor� volatile rates of inflation in 
the past . 
An attempt has been made to explore the possible existence of 
borrowing constraints. Regrettably, the tools used in this exercise are 
not powerful enough to reach any solid conclusion (even of a tentative 
nature) . While some of the information presented could be interpreted as 
certain evidence of the existence of borrowing constraints for German 
firms and for the households of both countries , alternative explanations 
can also easily be found . 
Arguably, if both countries were to take part in a monetary union in 
the near future, some of the differences observed in the financial 
structure of the private sector should be expected to diminish.  Firstly, 
to the extent that those differences are due to the past economic record 
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and policies applied -in particular, to the diverging level and volatility of 
inflation rates- , a single monetary policy should imply a greater 
convergence of balance sheets . This, however, will not be complete , since 
current differences in preferences are not only accounted for by 
diverging inflation experiences , but also by other unrelated factors, 
which are likely to persist. 
Secondly, since the movements in the exchange rates vis-a.-vis other 
countries entering the third stage will disappear, the income and wealth 
effects stemming from claims and liabilities denominated in those 
currencies when their exchange rates against the national currency 
fluctuate will cease to exist.  Provided that these instruments are a large 
share in total foreign-currency assets , it would be mitigated in currencies 
what probably is the most important observed difference among both 
countries: that arising from the divergent net foreign asset position of 
the firms' sector. Since these instruments will be denominated in the same 
currency, possible differences among both countries in the income and 
wealth effects associated with them will be just explained by their common 
characteristics to the rest of instruments. What is more, the position in 
net interest-bearing domestic currency denominated lia�ilities of both 
countries' firms (as scaled by GDP) will tend to converge -and , thus, 
presumably , also the income effects associated with them- from their 
current relatively higher level in Germany. To see this , note first that 
the flows of interest income on remunerated short-term assets and 
liabilities are precisely the opposite whether they are denominated in 
foreign or domestic currency. Second, that the current positions of both 
countries' firms in net foreign liabilities are also the opposite (with 
German and Spanish firms being net creditors and debtors , respectively) , 
while Germany holds larger domestic currency short-term interest­
bearing liabilities . Consequently, provided that a substantial proportion 
of the current foreign currency financial instruments have a short 
maturity , net (domestic currency) liabilities will tend to draw together if 
the former start to be denominated in the same currency in both 
countries. Finally, as to financial instruments denominated in the 
currencies of countries outside the monetary union, income and wealth 
effects will coincide as long as the proportions of the currencies of 
denomination do so. 
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However, the start of monetary union will not automatically increase 
the convergence of financial structures in other regards, if both 
countries were to take part in it . Along with the remaining differences in 
preferences, continuing divergent fiscal treatment of certain categories 
of financial instruments and flows (for instance, of interest receipts or of 
interest and loan redemption payments associated with the purchase of 
owner-occupied homes financed with debt) will determine the persistence 
of differences in private agents' balance sheets. 
Another aspect of the convergence of the balance-sheet transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy associated with the start of Stage Three 
refers to those steps of the process which have not been dealt with in this 
study. In particular, since there will be a single money and capital market 
in the whole area of the common currency, no differences will remain 
concerning the pass-through from official rates to short-term market 
rates (although differences may persist for longer-term rates provided 
that the underlying financial instruments are not perfect substitutes) . On 
the contrary , while differences in the process of wage formation in 
different countries may be tempered by the convergence of inflation rates 
and increased competition in the goods markets, rigidities in labour 
markets are likely to persist, given the expected low mobility of the work 
force. For this reason , ignoring how changes in aggregate demand are 
translated to output and prices in both countries remains a major 
shortcoming of the current exercise. 
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Table 8 
HOUSEHOLDS: SUMMARY OF MAIN INDICATORS OF THE POTENTIAL 
FOR WEALTH AND INCOME EFFECTS 
Net financial wealth/GOP 
Wealth effects 
- Domestic currency assets 
subject to wealth 
effects/GOP 
Income effects 
- Domestic currency net 
assets subject to income 
effects/GDP 
- Net interest receipts I 
disp. income 
Availability of alternative 
sources of finance 
GERMANY 
Positive 
+ 
SPAIN 
Positive 
+ 
Similar levels 
Higher in Germany. 
Tending to grow in both 
countries 
Similar levels . Tending 
to grow (decline) in 
Germany (Spain) 
Moderately large variability within a similar range in 
both countries 
Extremely limited access to alternative sources to 
bank credit 
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Table 9 
NON-FINANCIAL ENTERPRISES: SUMMARY OF MAIN INDICATORS OF THE POTENTIAL 
FOR WEALTH AND INCOME EFFECTS 
Net financial wealth/GOP 
Wealth effects 
- Domestic currency assets 
subject to wealth effects/GOP 
- Foreign currency net assets 
subject to wealth effects/GOP 
Income effects 
- Domestic currency net assets 
subject to income effects/GOP 
- Foreign currency net assets 
subject to income effects/GOP 
- Net interest receipts/disp. 
income 
Availability of alternative 
sources of finance 
GERMANY 
Negative 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
SPAIN 
Negative 
+ 
+ 
Higher level (in absolute 
value) in Spain. the difference 
tending to increase 
Higher in Germany, where it 
grows faster 
Difference tends to increase 
Higher in Germany . Difference 
tends to increase 
High at present similar levels . Somewhat larger variability in 
Spain. 
Dependence on bank credit tends to increase (reduce) in 
Germany (Spain) .  
Financing through shares is relatively important in both 
countries, but financing through fixed-income instruments is 
quite irrelevant. 
No information on credit between firms . 
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ANNEX. TREATMENT OF DATA 
1 .  TREATMENT OF THE DATA FROM THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS IN 
ORDER TO IMPROVE THEIR COMPARABILITY. 
Most of the data are drawn from the databases of the Bundesbank and 
the Banco de Espafia and have been published in Deutsche Bundesbank 
( 1994, 1995) and Banco de Espana ( 1 996) , which also contain 
methodological notes . Raw data have been treated in order to accommodate 
them to the purposes of this exercise and to improve comparability .  The 
main transformations made are : 
(a) Spain 
Households: 
1 . " Other assets" includes not only those labelled as such in the 
Spanish national accounts but also loans to non-financial enterprises 
(probably loans from individual firms rather than households ) .  Intra­
sectoral loans (loans among households) are not included under any 
heading, given that they do not appear in the German accounts. 
2. "Other liabilities" also includes loans from the public sector, as 
well as loans from non-financial enterprises. As in the case of the 
assets, intra-sectoral liabilities have been disregarded . 
3 .  Both headings also include the claims and liabilities to non­
residents. 
Non-financial enterprises : 
1 .  Intra-sectoral credit has been eliminated from both the assets and 
liabilities sides of the balance sheet. 
2 .  Although J for most instruments, information on claims and 
liabilities in foreign currency is available (which would have been more 
useful for the purposes of the exercise) , for comparability wHh 
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Germany the headings "Claims on non-residents" and "Liabilities to 
non-residents" have been built. 
( b )  Germany 
1 .  A very important adjustment is determined by the separate 
consideration in the financial accounts of the housing sector 
( "Wohnungswirtschaft" ) .  This sector has been imputed to the 
households and non-financial enterprises sectors in the proportion of 
80 and 20%, respectively. These proportions are obtained indirectly 
from the Banking Statistics prepared by the Bundesbank, by adding 
up the shares in total credit for housing purposes granted by credit 
institutions and " Bausparkassen" (building and loan associations) to 
households and roughly half of those granted to non-financial 
enterprises (which are assumed to be those whose final destination is 
housing for individual firms) . The proportions so obtained are applied 
to all headings of the financial accounts of the housing sector. 
Although for some headings this could be rather incorrect, their 
quantitative significance is rather low . 
2 .  "Other deposits" includes time deposits, savings deposits and 
funds placed with building and loan associations . 
3 .  " Insurance reserves" includes the funds placed with insurance 
enterprises (although in the text they are assumed on the whole to be 
long-term financial instruments, an estimated 10% of the total is not 
related to life insurance and pension fund schemes, but rather have a 
temporary nature, such as unsettled claims or premia to be refunded 
or brought forward ) and other claims on residents (since they consist 
mainly of employees' claims o� firms under retirement pension 
schemes) . 
4 .  "Other assets" comprises the claims on non-residents. 
5 .  "Loans from financial institutions" also includes insurance 
enterprise loans (as well as loans from credit institutions and building 
and loan associations) . 
- 78 -
2 .  DOMESTIC CURRENCY ASSETS SUBJECT TO WEALTH EFFECTS. 
The categories of assets giving rise to wealth effects are assumed to 
be bonds, shares , insurance reserves -just in the case of households­
and, to a certain extent, mutual fund certificates. 
In the case of households , insurance reserves refer mostly to long­
term capital accumulation with life insurance enterprises and private 
pension funds . Thus, they are included among assets from which wealth 
effects originate . For non-financial enterprises , insurance reserves are 
disregarded since they refer to claims of a temporary nature, such as 
unsettled claims or premia to be refunded . 
Money market funds are excluded . According to section 3 ,  this seems 
to be fully justified in the case of "distribution funds" .  As to accumulation 
funds , exclusion is probably less justified , since they have been assumed 
to give rise to moderate wealth effects. However J they would run in the 
opposite direction to that desired by monetary policy . Besides , it might 
be contended whether certificate holders regard capital gains and losses 
as changes in income rather than as changes in wealth ,  given the highly 
liquid nature of these assets . 
Another possible adjustment would concern those funds which 
distribute their earnings to the certificate holders . These are extremely 
unimportant in Spain, but in Germany they amount to around 85% of the 
value of all certificates of "Publikumsfonds" , that is , those in which 
individual investors can acquire certificates (as opposed to 
"Spezialfonds" , whose certificate holders are just institutional investors) . 
However ,  since it is not clear to what extent these funds distribute 
their capital gains (and since it is , nevertheless ,  clear that they do not 
"distribute" capital losses at all) , non-money market funds are assumed 
to give rise to wealth effects. In any case, excluding this type of fund 
changes the proportion of assets subject to wealth effects but marginally . 
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3 .  DOMESTIC CURRENCY FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS SUBJECT TO 
INCOME EFFECTS 
The identification of the financial instruments from which income 
effects arise is by no means an easy task. Ideally, such instruments 
should fulfil two conditions : they must involve regular interest flows and 
the financial contracts underlying those flows should either be signed for 
a short maturity or their conditions reviewed relatively often, so that 
either way official interest rates can affect the amount of the flows . 
However, in practice, limitations in the information provided in the 
financial accounts do not enable the instruments complying with both 
requirements to be clearly identified . Two different approximations are 
followed here. 
The first consists of grouping all assets and liabilities for which an 
explicit interest return exists , so that the second requirement is 
overlooked . On the liabilities side, loans from financial institutions are 
considered for both sectors, as well as short-term securities and bonds 
for firms . 
As to the assets , income effects are assumed to arise from deposits -
other than sight deposits, for which no remuneration at all is assumed- , 
short-term securities , bonds and mutual fund certificates (but only to the 
extent that the funds are of a "distributive" nature) . As it was earlier 
pointed out, this might not be however completely correct, since these 
funds may not only distribute interest income, but also dividends (funds 
which invest their proceeds in shares) and capital gains ( the former plus 
those investing in long-term securities) .  This poses the difficulty that. 
the direction of the income effects so identified is unclear: while changes 
in interest income from money market funds will weaken the transmission 
of monetary impulses , distributed capital gains would reinforce it (see 
section 3 ) .  In any event, for Germs,ny 85\ of all mutual funds are taken 
up -the share of "distribution" funds in all funds at the end of 1995- and 
none for Spain . 
The second approach moves clo�er to meeting both requirements , by 
considering those categories of net interest-bearing financial instruments 
for which it can be presumed that interest flows will be affected by 
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monetary policy in a relatively short time. What is required is the 
elimination of those assets and liabilities which were contracted in the past 
for a longer period of time than that relevant for monetary policy effects 
to show up . Compared to the previous classification, bonds and 
"distribution" mutual funds other than money market funds are dropped 
out on the assets side. The adjustment concerning mutual funds is made 
by taking up in the case of Germany a proportion of the "distribution" 
funds equal to the share in the total assets of all uPublikumsfonds" of 
those of a money market nature since the introduction of the latter in 
1994 . Thus, we are assuming that the share of IIdistribution" funds in 
money market funds coincides with that in all kinds of funds . 
Ideally. it might also be best to discard those deposits with the longest 
maturities . However, this is precluded by the degree of disaggregation 
provided by the financial accounts. Additionally, it would make sense to 
segregate, among liabilities , loans from financial institutions with longer 
maturities , but this is only possible in the case of Germany, since there 
is no disaggregated information on loans regarding their maturity in 
Spain . A further refinement (again unfortunately not possible for any of 
both countries) would take account of the fact that, among long-term 
loans , those with a variable rate should be included among those liabilities 
whose interest flows are presumed to be affected by monetary policy if the 
conditions of these loans are reviewed periodically enough, according to 
short-term market rates . 
Finally, as to the calculation of the share of net interest receipts or 
payments in disposable income, it is regrettably not possible to identify 
the flows stemming from financial instruments presumed to give rise to 
income effects. In particular, interest receipts arise on all kinds of 
deposits, short-term securities , bonds, mutual funds certificates -only 
in the case of Germany, where all income distributed by mutual funds is 
considered interest income in the national accounts- and, in the case of 
households even insurance reserves (whenever they are liabilities of 
insurance companies ) .  The inclusion of this category of assets among 
those from which income effects arise does not seem justified since the 
implicit returns on these highly illiquid assets do not contribute to 
households' cash-flow ( see section 3 in the main text ) .  However , the 
national accounts impute the returns on these assets to hOl,lseholds. While 
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separate figures on this imputed income are available for Spain, this is not 
the cas'e of Germany. For the sake of comparability , interest income 
including these returns is considered in the calculation of the share of net 
interest receipts or payments in disposable income . It must be kept in 
mind in any case that it is extremely unlikely that households will regard 
these implicit returns as part of their income . 
In the case of firms , interest receipts and payments arise from any 
category of interest-bearing claims and liabilities regardless of the 
currency of denomination. In particular , this includes short-term 
securities and bonds -both as assets and liabilities - ,  deposits of any kind 
-as assets- and loans from financial institutions -as liabilities- .  
4 .  FOREIGN CURRENCY FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH 
WEALTH AND INCOME EFFECTS. 
Due to the lack of data for Germany concerning private agents' assets 
and liabilities in foreign currency t these are replaced, for both 
countries, with the assets and liabilities held against non-residents. 
Additionally, differences in the coverage of the latter ag,gregates 
among both countries may impair comparability . In particular, financial 
credits , deposits, participations (other than shares) and claims arising 
from the ownership of land and property (which in the national accounts 
are considered to be bought by a fictitious domestic unit, which finances 
the purchase through a credit provided by the non-resident purchaser) 
are included in both cases . Commercial credit -included in Germany- is 
computed in Spain only if the maturity is longer than one year. Shares 
and bonds are included in Spain but not in Germany. 
5. CALCULATION OF INTEREST RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF 
PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS AND NON-FINANCIAL ENTERPRISES IN 
GERMANY . 
Some of the information presented in the main text involving interest 
income flows in Germany does not seem completely plausible. This may be 
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due to some possible lack of quality in the data used. The available 
information about interest receipts and expenditures of the German 
private sector is fragmented and incomplete. The Federal Statistics Office 
(FSO) publishes interest paid and received by the households and non­
financial enterprises sectors . However, the latter includes the housing 
sub-sector, for which separate figures do not exis t .  Since quite a large 
share of the interest expenditures of the housing sub-sector corresponds 
ultimately to households, it is required , in a first step , to impute part of 
the interest paid by non-financial enterprises (including housing) to the 
housing sub-sector and, in a second step, to impute the latter·s 
payments partly to households and partly to non-financial enterprises 
(excluding housing) . 
That problem does not show up in the interest receipts of the firms , as 
published by the FSO J since the housing sub-sector does not possess any 
assets (except for a small amount of cash and sight deposits) . 
Consequently, one can assume that the housing sub-sector does not 
receive any interest income, so that the FSO non-financial enterprises 
interest income series corresponds as well to the series when the housing 
sector is excluded . 
As far as the first step is concerned , an additional series compiled by 
the Bundesbank is available for the period up to 1990 (for West Germany) . 
This series refers to the net interest disbursements of non-financial 
enterprises (excluding housing) . Adding up the latter and the FSO series 
concerning the interest received by the secto.r (for which, as stated 
above, the inclusion of the housing sub-sector is irrelevant) , one can 
have the interest paid by non-financial enterprises (excluding housing) 
and so the disaggregation is completed . 
From 1991 on, the series are constructed in a more artificial way (for 
unified Germany) . The Bundesbank has not compiled the above-mentioned 
series . The only available series are those of the FSO, referring to the 
interest receipts and payments of the non-financial enterprises (including 
housing) .  Once again , the inclusion of the housing sub-sector is , as far 
as receipts are concerned J irrelevant. To disaggregate the interest 
payments among the housing sub-sector and non-financial enterprises 
(excluding that sub-sector) , their respective shares in the total for 1990 
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are applied to the period 1991-1994 (that Is, 33. 15% and 66 . 85%) . 
Finally, in the second step , 80% and 20%, respectively, of the housing 
sub-sector interest payments are imputed to households and to non­
financial enterprises J in accordance with the estimated distribution of the 
housing sub-sector liabilities among both sectors . 
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